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THE INTERSTATE COMMERCE ACT AND
THE SHERMAN ACT: PLAYING
RAILROAD TYCOON
RANDAL C. PICKER*
I start my antitrust class each year with the Supreme Court’s classic
1
1897 decision in United States v. Trans-Missouri Freight Association. It
is hard to imagine a better place to start. The case sits at the
intersection of the two great late-nineteenth-century business law
statutes: the Interstate Commerce Act (ICA) passed in 1887 and the
2
Sherman Act passed in 1890. And how often do you get to open a class
with the question, “How would you run a railroad cartel?”
In the era leading up to the ICA and the Sherman Act, railroad
pools and traffic associations were commonplace. No federal law sat as
a barrier to a private agreement to establish the rules of competition
among the members of the pool or association. Cartels today are forced
to sneak around, and, one suspects, this means that the understanding of
the cartel is rarely committed to paper by thoughtful lawyers. But the
pools and associations of the second half of the nineteenth century were
discussed openly and reported in newspapers as the ordinary affairs of
business. Consider the report in the New York Times, on July 10, 1878,
of the most recent gathering at Saratoga, New York, of the Vanderbilt
family and business interests. The prospects for a pool organized
around the New York Central Railroad were an active part of the
discussions: “Some of the railroaders believe that a general pool will
ruin the business, and about as many others say that a pool, if well
adhered to, would bring things up wonderfully. Few believe, however,
even if a general pooling arrangement should be made by the trunk
3
lines, that it would be generally adhered to.”

* Paul and Theo Leffmann Professor of Commercial Law, The University of Chicago
Law School; Senior Fellow, The Computation Institute of the University of Chicago and
Argonne National Laboratory. I thank the Burton and Adrienne Glazov Faculty Fund and
the Microsoft Fund for their generous research support.
1. 166 U.S. 290 (1897).
2. Ch. 104, 24 Stat. 379 (1887); Ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209 (1890).
3. A Vanderbilt Congress, N.Y. TIMES, July 10, 1878.
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This was the central problem of these arrangements. There is an
incentive to cheat within cartels, and even though the agreements could
be set out in great detail and often were, the agreements themselves
weren’t enforceable in court. It is one thing to stop short of condemning
these agreements and something else to bring the force of the legal
system to bear in enforcing them.
And yet the railroads continued to try. At the time that the ICA was
passed, according to the agency that it established, there were eleven
substantial traffic associations in place, covering the entire competitive
railroad traffic in the United States. The post-Civil War period had seen
an explosion in track miles from roughly 30,000 miles in 1860 to about
4
70,000 miles in 1873. The structure of competition quite literally
embedded in the ground had shifted, and the railroads were struggling
to create an institutional structure that matched it.
On March 15, 1889, the railroads that would comprise the Trans5
Missouri Freight Association set out their agreement. Section 5 of the
6
ICA had barred one institutional arrangement, the railroad pool. The
pool was an effort to enforce cartel arrangements by requiring the
sharing of revenues or profits. How much traffic a railroad received
didn’t really matter under a pool. What mattered was money, and if
profits were split, competitive discipline would follow. The ICA took
pools off of the table but was understood to have left room for other
types of contractual arrangements, such as agreements on rates.
Controlling those rates was the chief topic of the association agreement
for the Trans-Missouri group.
The Trans-Missouri agreement was to go in effect on April 1, 1889,
but with the passage of the Sherman Act on July 2, 1890, circumstances
7
had changed dramatically. By the standards of modern statutes, the
Sherman Act was a little nothing, barely a page-and-a-half in the
Statutes at Large. (The ICA itself ran nearly nine pages.) But within
two years, the federal government challenged the very existence of the
freight association as a violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Of course, a central concern of the Interstate Commerce Act was
rates. All charges were to be “reasonable and just,” and if that wasn’t
4.
(2009).
5.
6.
7.
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Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 292 (statement of the case).
24 Stat. at 380.
166 U.S. at 304 (statement of the case).
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sufficiently clear, the Act turned around and “prohibited and declared
8
to be unlawful” “every unjust and unreasonable charge.” The Act
barred unjust discrimination in rates and undue or unreasonable
preferences and, in case it wasn’t already covered, specifically
9
condemned short-haul/long-haul discrimination. The Sherman Act
itself didn’t address rates directly at all, and antitrust’s own version of an
anti-discrimination regime wouldn’t show up until 1914 in the Clayton
10
Act (and then even more so in 1936 in the Robinson–Patman Act). All
that Section 1 of the Sherman Act forbade was contracts in restraint of
trade, and it said nothing about the reasonableness or unreasonableness
of those restraints.
But what exactly was the mechanism by which the ICA’s not-toohot, not-too-cold pricing regime was to emerge? In an industry
populated by small firms, we expect atomistic competition to result in
prices equal to average costs. Faced with monopoly, we can expect high
prices and deadweight losses, but the railroads sat in that uncomfortable
middle ground. The railroads knew—and argued to the Court in TransMissouri—that the competitive structure of railroads was perverse and
needed something more than purely unbridled competition to sustain a
11
healthy industry. Railroads were a special-use property. They couldn’t
easily be turned into something else if the railroad business turned out
to be oppressively competitive. The railroads sought the opportunity to
prove that their rates were reasonable—as required by the ICA—and
that the association agreement was the mechanism to produce
reasonable rates.
In the Supreme Court, the Trans-Missouri association argued that
the railroad business had to be understood as exempt from the Sherman
Act—that the much more specific Interstate Commerce Act, designed
for railroads, had to control over the more general terms of the Sherman
Act. Alternatively, assuming that the Sherman Act did indeed apply to
them, the railroads wanted to contend that their restraints were
acceptable under the Sherman Act given that they were necessary to
produce the reasonable charges required under the ICA. Certainly,

8. Interstate Commerce Act § 1, 24 Stat. at 379.
9. Id. §§ 3, 4. 24 Stat. at 380.
10. Ch. 323, 38 Stat. 730 (1914); Ch. 592, 49 Stat. 1526 (1936).
11. Trans-Missouri Freight Ass’n, 166 U.S. at 310–11.
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suggested the association, the Sherman Act didn’t forbid all contracts in
12
restraint of trade but just those that unreasonably restrained trade.
In a 5–4 decision, the Supreme Court rejected both propositions.
The Sherman Act was passed more than three years after the ICA, so it
would have been easy enough for Congress to carve out the railroads
from the new antitrust statute, but nothing like that had been done.
And, in similar fashion, it would have been easy enough for Congress to
expressly limit Section 1 of the Sherman Act to bar only unreasonable
restraints of trade. Had this been done, the Court seemed to suggest,
then the railroads would have been given the chance to prove that their
13
agreement would “only keep rates up to a reasonable price.” But
Section 1 barred all restraints of trade, both reasonable and
unreasonable, and the agreement of the Trans-Missouri Freight
Association was found to violate the Sherman Act.
What were the railroads to do? Railroad pools had been the
preferred method for enforcing railroad cartels, but those were
expressly barred by the ICA. Railroads had countered with the rate
associations, which seemed to sidestep the ICA but were now
condemned by the Sherman Act. The answer took two forms: seek
more legislation and continue their practices much as they had before,
notwithstanding the decision in Trans-Missouri.
As to legislation, the ICC reported in its twelfth annual report, dated
January 11, 1899, that the railroads were seeking new legislation that
they hoped would solve the problems that they had faced for the last
14
half century. The railroads didn’t want merely an exemption from the
Sherman Act or a repeal of the anti-pooling provisions of the ICA.
Instead, the railroads wanted the power to enter into rate and pooling
agreements that would be enforceable in court—agreements with teeth.
In the meantime, the railroads tried to operate as they had before.
The 1902 annual report of the Interstate Commerce Commission
explained the realities of railroad life:
It is not the business of this Commission to enforce the
antitrust act, and we express no opinion as to the legality of the
means adopted by these associations. We simply call attention
to the fact that the decision of the United States Supreme Court

12. Id. at 340.
13. Id.
14. 12 ICC ANN. REP. 14 (1899).
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in the Trans-Missouri case and the Joint Traffic Association case
has produced no practical effect upon the railway operations of
the country. Such associations, in fact, exist now as they did
before those decisions, and with the same general effect. In
justice to all parties we ought probably to add that it is difficult
to see how our interstate railways could be operated, with due
regard to the interests of the shipper and the railway, without
concerted action of the kind afforded through these
15
associations.
This was the first decade or so of the Interstate Commerce Act.
How would the rate provisions of the Act be implemented? The Act
itself was understood not to give direct rate-setting authority to the
Interstate Commerce Commission.16 The railroads themselves tried to
set rates through the traffic associations, much as they had tried to do
with the pooling arrangements that had preceded the ICA. The result in
Trans-Missouri seemed to bar those arrangements under the Sherman
Act.
The path forward from there was complex and with many fits and
starts. Legislation was proposed to amend the Sherman Act to limit
Section 1 to barring unreasonable restraints of trade, but the Supreme
Court itself rendered that unnecessary in 1911 in its “reinterpretation”
17
of Section 1 in the Standard Oil case. On the railroad side, the 1920
Transportation Act finally gave the ICC rate-setting authority (even
beyond the authority to determine maximum rates that the 1906
18
In 1948, with the passage of the Reed–
Hepburn Act provided).
Bulwinkle Act, the intersection of the ICA and the Sherman Act was
finally dovetailed: The ICC was given the authority to approve carriers’
private agreements on rates, and that approval in turn conferred
19
antitrust immunity on those arrangements.
This was in many ways the path forward seen by the Interstate
Commerce Commission as early as 1899. The commission both was
familiar with life for railroads as it had been before the two great
business acts and then had seen how those acts had worked together for
15. 15 ICC ANN. REP. 16 (1902).
16. See James. W. Ely, Jr., The Troubled Beginning of the Interstate Commerce Act, 95
MARQ. L. REV. 1131, 1133–34 (2012).
17. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911) (holding that the Sherman Act
proscribes only combinations that unduly restrain trade).
18. Ch. 91, § 416, 41 Stat. 456, 484 (1920); cf. ch. 3591, § 4, 34 Stat. 584, 589–90 (1906).
19. Ch. 491, 62 Stat. 472 (1948).
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a decade culminating in the Trans-Missouri case in 1897 and the Joint20
Traffic Association case in 1898. The commission noted that “many
thoughtful persons” believed that “unrestricted competition was
inconsistent with the purposes aimed at” by the Interstate Commerce
21
The
Act, and the commission was inclined to agree with them.
commission further noted that there was “no great nation at the present
time which endeavors to enforce competition between its railways,
22
although in many cases that method has been tried and abandoned.”
Competition needed to be restricted and railroads needed to be allowed
to accomplish this through agreement but subject to oversight by the
commission to protect the public interest. Five decades later, the early
vision of the commission was fulfilled. Of course, whether that was a
good result is a question for another day.

20. United States v. Joint Traffic Ass’n, 171 U.S. 505 (1898).
21. 12 ICC ANN. REP. 19–20 (1899).
22. Id. at 20; see Paul Stephen Dempsey, The Rise and Fall of the Interstate Commerce
Commission: The Tortuous Path from Regulation to Deregulation of America’s Infrastructure,
95 MARQ. L. REV. 1151, 1160 (2012).

